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1 Introduction
The last 30 years have seen a sustained process of financial globalization, with countries
around the world opening their capital accounts and joining international financial markets.
With the passing of time, both in academic and policy circles an initially benign view toward
openness to international capital flows has given way to a more skeptical approach. The
IMF’s inclusion of capital controls in its recommended policy toolbox epitomizes the shift
in thinking (Ostry et al., 2010; WEO, 2011). Not only are episodes of large capital inflows
thought to set the stage for subsequent financial crises, but the impact of inflows on economic
performance during tranquil times has also been called into question (Giavazzi and Spaventa,
2010; Powell and Tavella, 2012).
Figure 1 summarizes the experience of Spain, which was in many ways typical of the countries
in the Eurozone periphery. Following the launch of the Euro, Spain received large capital
inflows (panel a), coinciding with a consumption boom (panel b). Moreover, Spain expe-
rienced a shift of resources out of sectors producing tradable goods such as manufacturing
and into the production of nontradable goods, such as construction (panel c). During the
same period, Spain saw a slow down in productivity growth (panel d). These developments
have led some authors to draw a connection between episodes of large capital inflows and
slowdowns in productivity growth, since capital inflows can trigger a movement of resources
toward nontradable sectors characterized by slow productivity growth (Benigno and Fornaro,
2014; Reis, 2013).
While the narrative evidence from the Eurozone periphery appears compelling, it remains
unclear to what extent these countries’ experience is typical of recipients of large capital
inflows. In the second half of the 1990s, Brazil received capital inflows of a magnitude similar
to those flowing to the Eurozone periphery (Figure 2, panel a). While Brazil did experience
a consumption boom (panel b), the share of employment dedicated to manufacturing was
steady or rising, reversing its earlier downward trend (panel c). Similarly, the inflows episode
in Brazil saw a net improvement in TFP (panel d). Precisely how periods of large capital
inflows aﬀect recipient economies thus remains an open question. Moreover, the issue has
acquired new urgency as capital flows to emerging market economies have surged in the five
years since the 2008 financial crisis.
This paper provides a systematic analysis of how large capital inflows aﬀect macroeconomic
performance and the sectoral allocation of productive resources. We examine 155 episodes of
large capital inflows over the last 35 years in a group of 70 middle- and high-income countries.
We find that these episodes coincide with an economic boom, in which output, consumption,
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Figure 1: Spain: Capital Inflows and Macroeconomic Performance, 1998-2012
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investment, employment, and domestic credit all rise initially. However, once capital inflows
subside and credit contracts, the boom leaves place to a recession. Alongside these aggregate
macroeconomic dynamics, at the sectoral level we find that large capital inflows are associated
with an expansion of nontradable sectors, such as services and construction, at the expenses
of the sectors producing tradable goods, including agricultural products and manufactured
goods.
Studying the manufacturing sector in detail, we find that the share of both employment
and investment allocated to manufacturing drops during episodes of large capital inflows. In
particular, while the reallocation of investment is a general phenomenon in our sample, the
reallocation of labor occurs specifically during episodes in which governments do not oﬀset
capital inflows through substantial purchases of foreign assets, and during episodes that begin
when international liquidity is abundant. Hence, our empirical results are consistent with
the predictions of a standard two-sectors small open economy model, according to which
capital inflows driven by an increase in access to foreign capital should generate a shift of
productive resources out of sectors producing tradable goods, and into sectors producing
non-tradable goods (Rebelo and Vegh, 1995; Reis, 2013; Benigno and Fornaro, 2014)
We next consider how the behavior of macroeconomic indicators during an inflows episode
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Figure 2: Brazil: Capital Inflows and Macroeconomic Performance, 1990-2004
−1
0
−8
−6
−4
−2
0
2
Cu
rre
nt
 A
cc
ou
nt
 (%
 G
DP
)
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
(a): Current Account
−5
0
5
%
 D
ev
iat
ion
 fr
om
 H
P 
Tr
en
d
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
(b): Consumption
0
.0
2
.0
4
.0
6
.0
8
Sh
ar
e 
of
 T
ot
al 
Em
plo
ym
en
t
−4
−2
0
2
Cu
rre
nt
 A
cc
ou
nt
 (%
GD
P)
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Current Account (%GDP) Trend 1975−1995
Actual Employment Share 95% Confidence Band
(c): Employment in Manufacturing
5.
5
5.
6
5.
7
5.
8
5.
9
Lo
g 
TF
P
−4
−2
0
2
Cu
rre
nt
 A
cc
ou
nt
 (%
GD
P)
1990 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004
Current Account (%GDP) Trend 1975−1995
Actual TFP 95% Confidence Band
(d): Total Factor Productivity
Sources: IMF BoPS, WDI, PWT, UNIDO, ILO
relates to the probability that the episode coincides with a capital flows reversal or a sudden
stop. Evidence from probit regressions suggests that, while economic conditions before and
during the episodes of large capital inflows are not systematically related to whether or
not capital flows reverse sharply, both a larger credit boom and larger capital inflows are
associated with a higher probability of a sudden stop, in which a capital flows reversal is
accompanied by an output contraction.
We also investigate the existence of a relationship between the behavior of the economy
during the inflows and the post-inflows slump. Regressing post-episode macroeconomic per-
formance more generally on conditions before and during the boom, we find that larger credit
and inflows are associated with a deeper fall in GDP, consumption, investment, employment
and TFP at the end of the episode. Moreover, the reallocation of labor out of manufacturing
is robustly and significantly related to economic performance after large capital inflows come
to an end, with a stronger shift of labor out of manufacturing during the inflows episode
associated with a sharper contraction in the aftermath of the episode. Reserve accumulation
during the episode appears to dampen the negative after eﬀects of large capital inflows, even
when we control for the sectoral reallocation with which it is correlated. It thus appears that
foreign reserve accumulation acts through multiple channels to insulate the economy from
the dislocation associated with episodes of large capital inflows.
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This paper contributes to two areas of literature. First, in focusing on episodes of un-
usually large capital inflows, our work is related to the study of what have been called
capital flow bonanzas or surges. Our methodology, taken from the literature on credit booms
(Gourinchas et al., 2001; Tornell and Westermann, 2002; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008), iden-
tifies periods in which the level of capital inflows is unusually large. By contrast, the literature
on surges has generally examined the causes (Forbes and Warnock, 2012) and consequences
(Reinhart and Reinhart, 2009; Kalantzis, 2014) of unusually large changes in capital in-
flows. Ghosh et al. (2014) study unusually high levels of capital inflows, but they examine
the causes of such episodes specifically in emerging markets, while we focus on the conse-
quences of large capital inflows in both emerging and advanced economies. The experience
of Eurozone countries highlights the value of our approach. Capital inflows to Spain grew
steadily, eventually exceeding 10 percent of GDP, but never jumped as in a surge.
The work closest to our paper is research by Cardarelli et al. (2010) and Caballero (2014),
both of whom also examine episodes in which the level of capital inflows is unusually high.
Whereas Cardarelli et al. (2010) analyze policy responses to large capital inflows, we study
the eﬀects of such episodes on the real economy. Caballero (2014) focuses on how large
inflows aﬀect the likelihood of banking crises, whereas our work highlights the way large
capital inflows aﬀect the sectoral allocation of resources. Using a slightly diﬀerent measure
of capital inflows than these papers allows us to examine episodes over a longer timespan.
Importantly, with respect to existing works, our data include the large capital flows to the
Eurozone periphery in the mid-2000s as well as recent capital flows to emerging markets.
Second, our work contributes to research on how external factors interact with the sectoral
allocation of production to aﬀect economic performance. Rodrik (2008) documents that an
undervalued exchange rate is associated with faster economic growth, and presents evidence
that the reallocation of resources into the production of tradable goods generates this re-
lationship. Analyzing the impact of sectoral allocation on aggregate productivity in more
detail, McMillan and Rodrik (2011) show that a shift of productive resources into relatively
less productive sectors has in many countries severely dampened aggregate productivity
growth, even as resource allocation within sectors has improved. Our empirical findings are
consistent with Rodrik’s in that we show that large capital inflows are associated with both
real exchange rate appreciation and a reallocation of resources out of the manufacturing sec-
tor, as well as a subsequent slowdown in both output and productivity.1 Finally, Converse
(2014) presents evidence that the financial uncertainty generated by volatile international
1In this sense, our results help rationalize the findings of Alfaro et al. (2014) and Gourinchas and Jeanne
(2013), which highlight how capital tends to flow toward those developing countries in which productivity
growth is slower.
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capital flows can shift the sectoral allocation of investment in emerging markets, depressing
aggregate TFP and growth.
The key novelty of our paper with respect to these two literatures lies in the systematic
description of how the share of productive resources allocated to manufacturing behaves in
a large sample of episodes of large capital inflows. In fact, it has been documented in the
context of exchange rate based stabilization programs (Rebelo and Vegh, 1995), and of credit
booms (Gourinchas et al., 2001; Tornell and Westermann, 2002; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008)
that the share of tradable sectors in GDP drops with inflows of capital. However, to the
best of our knowledge, we are the first ones providing direct evidence on the allocation of
labor and investment across sectors in a large sample of inflows episodes, and connecting the
sectoral reallocation of resources during the inflows to the post-inflows slump.
The rest of the paper begins by describing the data and methodology we use to identify
episodes of large capital inflows in Section 2. In Section 3 we examine how key macroeconomic
variables and the sectoral allocation of productive resources behave during and after inflows
episodes. In section 4 we consider how the behavior of the economy during the inflows relates
to the probability that an episode ends up in a reversal or a sudden stop and how it aﬀects
the post-episode economic performance more generally. Section 5 concludes.
2 Data and Methodology
2.1 Identifying Capital Inflows Episodes
As a measure of capital inflows into the economy we use the current account deficit plus the
increase in holdings of oﬃcial reserves.2 All data on international capital flows are taken
from the IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics (BoPS) data base. Such a broad measure of
capital inflows may seem at odds with recent work on the subject, which has shown important
diﬀerences in the behavior of private and public flows (Alfaro et al., 2014) as well as gross
and net flows (Rothenberg and Warnock, 2011; Forbes and Warnock, 2012; Broner et al.,
2013). However, our focus here is the impact of capital flows in recipient countries, meaning
that the origins and drivers of those flows is of less importance for our analysis.
We do add reserve accumulation to our measure of capital inflows, however, in order to be
2A current account deficit carries a positive sign in what follows, since this corresponds to net capital
inflows.
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able to diﬀerentiate between large capital inflows and the policy response to them.3 When
the government purchases foreign reservers, it oﬀsets the liabilities incurred when foreigners
acquire claims on domestic residents. By adding reserve accumulation to the current account,
we undo this netting out. In Sections 3 and 4 we explore in detail whether the strategy of
reducing the current account deficit through the acquisition of oﬃcial reserves aﬀects how
the economy responds to large capital inflows.
Having selected our preferred inflows measure, we normalize by GDP in order to capture
the size of the flows relative the economy.4 We then detrend the normalized series using an
HP filter because we observe in the data that numerous economies exhibit medium- or long-
run trends in the size of capital inflows, presumably for varying structural reasons. Most
obviously, the neoclassical growth model predicts that capital-scarce economies will receive
capital inflows that diminish in size as the economy converges to its steady-state level of
capital.5 A downward trend in capital inflows is also consistent with models of convergence
to a technological frontier (as in Krugman 1979 or Grossman and Helpman 1991). We are
not interested in large capital flows that emerge in the course of a long-run trend, but rather
on short- and medium-term jumps in capital inflows that occur along this transition path in
response to shocks. Detrending the series allows us to identify precisely such events.
In order to identify periods of exceptionally large capital inflows, we follow a procedure
commonly used in research on credit booms (Gourinchas et al., 2001; Mendoza and Terrones,
2008) which has more recently been applied to international capital flows (Cardarelli et al.,
2010; Caballero, 2014). We calculate the long-run standard deviation of our detrended
capital inflows measure for each country, and flag years in which inflows rise more than one
standard deviation above their trend.6 These flagged country-years mark the existence of
an episode of large capital inflows. An episode begins when inflows first rise more than half
3Reinhart and Reinhart (2009) describe reserve accumulation less the current account balance as “the
best indicator of capital flows,” but ultimately use the current account balance in order to lengthen the
period covered by their analysis. In excluding changes in reserves from our net capital inflows measure, our
approach is similar to that of Ghosh et al. (2014), who also subtract government borrowing from oﬃcial
sources.
4Specifically, the capital inflows are measured in current US dollars and then normalized by the trend
component of GDP in current US dollars.
5Chapter 2 of Obstfeld and Rogoﬀ (1996) provides a textbook treatment on the role of capital flows in
the neoclassical growth model.
6Unlike Gourinchas et al. (2001) and Cardarelli et al. (2010) we take the trend over the entire sample
period for each country, rather than a country-year-specific expanding window tend. This is because our
rationale for detrending diﬀers substantially. Cardarelli et al. (2010) study policy responses to capital inflows
and therefore detrend in order to determine whether contemporary policy-makers would have seen the inflows
as unusually large. We detrend to determine whether the inflows are large relative to the long-run trajectory
of the economy. This diﬀerence in motivation makes the long-run trend more appropriate than an expanding
window.
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a standard deviation above their trend level and ends when they again come within half a
standard deviation of their trend.7
The case of Brazil, depicted in Figure 3, demonstrates the merits of our approach to iden-
tifying large capital inflows. First, at several points the Brazilian authorities have oﬀset
large capital inflows by purchasing substantial foreign exchange reserves. This can be seen
in the divergence of the current account (the dotted black line) and our measure of capital
inflows (the solid blue line). To highlight the clearest and most recent example, note that
during the four years after the 2008 financial crisis, Brazil received approximately US$50
billion in capital inflows, an average of 4.5 percent of GDP per year. At the same time,
the country’s foreign exchange reserves nearly doubled. The accumulation of assets by the
monetary authorities meant that Brazil’s current account deficit averaged only 2.5 percent of
GDP during a time of large capital inflows, much discussed by policy-makers and the media
as well as evident in the data.
Figure 3: Identifying Episodes of Capital Inflows: Brazil
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In Figure 3 we also plot the HP trend—the solid black line. This shows how the typical size
of capital inflows has varied over time, and supports our use of HP filtered inflows to decide
7In the terminology used by Mendoza & Terrones (2008), we set the entry and exit thresholds for the
detrended current account equal to 0.5.
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when capital inflows are unusually large. What would have been considered an unusually
large capital in the late 1980s would not stand out as particularly large in the late 2000s.
Although for some countries balance of payments data extend as far back as the 1940s, the
IMF Balance of Payments data cover substantially fewer countries prior to the early 1970s.
We therefore restrict our attention to capital inflows episodes occurring between 1975 and
2010. We exclude from the analysis countries with a population that never exceeds one
million, as well as those with annual GDP that remains below one billion dollars throughout
the period we study. This has the virtue of excluding several oﬀshore financial centers where
the relationship between capital flows and the real economy might diﬀer substantially from
the typical economy. We also remove from our dataset major oil exporters and countries
eligible to receive World Bank International Development Association (IDA) assistance.8
Where oil price movements and donors’ willingness to provide foreign aid determine the
external balance, the relationship between capital inflows and the real economy presumably
diﬀers substantially from most other economies.
We experimented with alternate methodologies for identifying episodes in order to verify the
robustness of our results to the use of diﬀerent capital inflows measures, detrending methods,
and thresholds. Thus, we identified episodes using two alternate measures of capital inflows:
the raw current account as a share of GDP and the current account in constant US dollars
normalized by population. We also detrended the current account using a linear trend rather
than an HP filter. Finally, we raised the threshold for identifying episodes from one to 1.5
standard deviations, and (separately) lowered the exit and entry threshold from 0.5 to zero.
Using alternate inflows measures does change the set of events that are identified as episodes
of large capital inflows, while alternate detrending methods and thresholds alter the average
length of the episodes. Since a linear trend is less flexible than an HP trend, the variable
can diverge from the trend for longer. Likewise, a lower threshold prolongs the duration of
those episodes which do not start and stop abruptly.
2.2 Other Variables
Having identified episodes of large capital inflows, we are particularly interested in how these
episodes end. Do inflows gradually taper oﬀ or do they stop abruptly? Does the economy
experience a hard landing once inflows subside? Following the large literature on crises and
8The main criterion for IDA eligibility is a PPP-adjusted per-capita GDP of less than US $1,195. The
IDA provides grants as well as concessional lending to eligible countries.
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sudden stops, we identify capital flow reversals and sudden stops using the methodology
developed by Calvo et al. (2004).9 In this classification scheme, a reversal occurs when the
year-on-year change in capital inflows is at least two standard deviations below the mean. A
sudden stop occurs when a reversal coincides with an output contraction. We deem a capital
inflows episode to coincide with a reversal or sudden stop if one of these events occurs at
any point during the episode or in the year immediately after the episode ends.
Several authors have suggested a link between aggregate productivity and capital inflows
(Aoki et al., 2010) as well as closely related variables such as the real exchange rate (Rodrik,
2008). In order to further explore these links we calculate total factor productivity (TFP)
for a broad sample of countries over an extended time period using data on output and
investment obtained from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2013). We estimate initial
capital stock using the method described in Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare (1997) and calcu-
late capital stock for subsequent years using the annual values of investment obtained from
the Penn World Tables. In calculating TFP, we use employment data from the International
Labor Organization’s LABORSTA data set rather than the labor force data provided by the
Penn World Tables. This ensures that fluctuations in TFP around episodes of large capital
inflows are not the result of changes in the unemployment rate. We calculate aggregate to-
tal factor productivity using standard growth accounting (e.g. as in Benhabib and Spiegel,
2005). This methodology allows us to measure TFP in nearly all of the 69 countries in which
we observe episodes of large capital inflows.
Macroeconomic data are from the standard sources, including the IMF International Fi-
nancial Statistics (IFS) and the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). We
also analyze international liquidity conditions at the time of capital inflows episodes, taking
movements of the eﬀective Federal Funds rate, obtained from the Federal Reserve Economic
Database (FRED) as a proxy for changes in the rates attached to international lending.
We calculate real rates by subtracting from the nominal rate inflation during the previous
year, which we use as a proxy for expected inflation. To measure the risk aversion of major
international investors we use the VIX index. The VIX measures the implied volatility of
S&P index options and thus reflects the price of risk in U.S. equity markets. When the price
of risk and thus the VIX is low, it can be inferred that risk aversion is low.10
9Rothenberg and Warnock (2011) and Forbes and Warnock (2012) use this approach to identify both
surges and sudden stops in gross capital flows.
10More specifically, we use the “original” VIX index or VXO, which measures the implied volatility of
options on the S&P100 and which is available since the late 1980s. To obtain a measure of risk aversion from
1970 to 1986 we regress the realized volatility of the S&P 100 on the VXO for the post-1986 period and use
the estimated coeﬃcients to back-cast the VXO.
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We obtain data on manufacturing sector employment, value-added, and investment from
the UNIDO INDSTAT2 database. As the UNIDO data are in nominal terms, we deflate
them using the aggregate GDP deflator (taken from the WDI), as is standard in the lit-
erature (e.g. Kroszner et al., 2007; Ciccone and Papaioannou, 2009; Gupta and Yuan, 2009;
Levchenko et al., 2009; Rajan and Subramanian, 2011).11 Appendix A provides detailed de-
scriptions of which data were drawn from which source.
2.3 Descriptive Statistics
Our baseline methodology identifies 164 episodes of large capital inflows occurring in 70
countries between 1975 and 2010. Of these, 54 took place in advanced economies and 67 in
emerging markets. A full list of these episodes is provided in Appendix A.12 Our methodology
captures nearly all well known examples of large capital inflows. These include events in
emerging markets such as the lead-up to crises in Latin America in the early 1980s, the
exchange-rate-based based stabilization programs in the region later in the decade, which
were accompanied by large inflows (Ve´gh, 1992; Rebelo and Vegh, 1995), and the run-up to
the East Asian crises during the mid-1990s.
In addition, our sample includes advanced country cases such as Scandinavia and the United
Kingdom in the early 1990s, and the Eurozone periphery in the mid-2000s. We also pick up
less well-known episodes that did not end in a crisis, such as inflows to Canada in the late
1980s. Importantly, the episodes we identify include the large capital inflows to emerging
markets such as Brazil, Indonesia, and Turkey following the 2008 crisis. The number of
episodes we identify is consistent with the findings of Reinhart and Reinhart (2009), who
identify 207 capital flow “bonanzas” in middle- and high-income countries between 1980 and
2007, of which 112 last more than one year.
Figure 4 plots the number of countries undergoing episodes of large capital inflows in each
year. The number of episodes varies substantially over time, with increases in the number
of episodes in the early 1980s and 1990s, and again in the late 2000s. Notably, the number
of countries receiving exceptionally large inflows was significantly larger during the most
recent surge in episodes than in the past. Presumably this pattern reflects the fact that
11Since industry-level deflators are not available for a broad set of countries, the alternate approach taken
by Koren and Tenreyro (2007) is to use US industry-level deflators. We use the method most widely used
in the literature.
12We define emerging markets broadly, including in this category countries in either the JPMorgan Emerg-
ing Market Bond Index (EMBI) or the S&P/International Finance Corporation Emerging Markets Database
Investable Index (S&P IFCI Index). Advanced economies are the high-income members of the OECD.
11
governments have consistently liberalized controls on capital inflows since the 1970s, as
documented, for example, by Chinn and Ito (2006). The type of countries receiving large
inflows has also fluctuated. During the late 1980s advanced economies were nearly the only
countries receiving large inflows. More recently, the majority of large inflows episodes have
taken place in emerging markets, although other economies, which comprise smaller and
relatively poorer countries sometimes called frontier markets, have also seen their share in
the number of episodes increase.
Figure 4: Frequency of Large Inflows Episodes Over Time
0
10
20
30
40
Nu
m
be
r o
f C
ou
nt
rie
s U
nd
er
go
ing
 In
flo
ws
 E
pis
od
e
197
5   
198
0   
198
5   
199
0   
199
5   
200
0   
200
5   
201
0
Advanced Economies
Emerging Markets
Other Countries
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics about the episodes of large capital inflows that we
identify, broken down by region. Overall roughly one third of the episodes occur in advanced
economies, while Latin America, Asia, and Eastern Europe have experienced similar shares
of the episodes. The average episode of large inflows lasts approximately three and a half
years, with little variation across regions in the typical length. With the exception of Asia,
the size of the current account relative to the economy during these episodes is substantially
larger in emerging markets than in advanced economies.
The measure of capital inflows that we use to identify episodes of unusually large flows is
deliberately general, capturing net inflows of all types apart from those initiated by the
domestic government in each country. However, in Table 2, we look more closely at the
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Table 1: Capital Inflows Episodes: Summary Statistics
Number of Ave. Duration Ave. CA
Episodes (% of total) (years) Deficit (%GDP)
Total 155 3.5 4.7
Advanced Economies 54 (35.3) 3.4 3.2
Latin America 28 (18.3) 3.4 5.5
Asia 24 (15.7) 3.7 1.9
Eastern Europe 25 (16.3) 3.6 7
Middle East 5 (3.3) 3.8 9.6
Sub-Saharan Africa 17 (11.1) 2.9 5
Sources: IMF BoPS, Authors’ Calculations
behavior of component flows in each episode. Overall half of these episodes coincide with
unusually large gross inflows, with this share significantly higher for emerging economies than
for the rest.13 Portfolio flows—so-called hot money—are large in 37 percent of episodes, a
share that is constant across country groups. In 45 percent of episodes, FDI flows were
unusually large, and again this share does not vary substantially between country groups.
Finally, large flows in the residual other flows category, which is primarily comprised of
cross-border lending by banks but also includes trade credit, were present in just over 60
percent of the cases we study. This finding is consistent with, for example, recent work
by Bruno and Shin (2014) documenting the important role played by banks in cross-border
capital flows. Moreover, in this paper we study not only recent episodes but also episodes
that took place in the late 1970s and early 1980s when bank lending played a relatively more
important role in cross border capital flows. Bank flows also were a substantial part of the
capital flows in the Eurozone in the 2000s.
Table 3 examines the relationship between the capital inflows episodes that we identify,
capital flow reversals, and sudden stops. Of the episodes of unusually large capital inflows
that we study, 123 (77 percent) end in a reversal as defined by Calvo et al. (2004). Just
over 40 percent inflows episodes coincided with a sudden stop.14 Table 3 suggests that
the probability than an episode ends up in a capital flows reversal is similar for advanced
and emerging economics, while sudden stops occur somewhat more frequently in advanced
economies.
13Here we use the same criteria to identify unusually large component flows that we used in identifying
large net inflows.
14Recall that according to Calvo et al. (2004) and others (Rothenberg and Warnock, 2011;
Forbes and Warnock, 2012), a reversal occurs when the year on year change in capital inflows is at least
two standard deviations below the mean. A sudden stop occurs when a reversal coincides with an output
contraction Calvo et al. (2004).
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Table 2: Capital Inflows Episodes and Types of Capital Flows
Advanced Emerging Other
Economies Economies Economies Total
Total Episodes: 54 67 34 155
Of which, coincide with:
Large Gross Inflows 23 42 14 79
(% of Group Total) (42.6) (62.7) (41.2) (51)
Large Portfolio Inflows 22 24 12 58
(% of Group Total) (40.7) (35.8) (35.3) (37.4)
Large FDI Inflows 25 31 14 70
(% of Group Total) (46.3) (46.3) (41.2) (45.2)
Large Other Inflows 28 45 24 97
(% of Group Total) (51.9) (67.2) (70.6) (62.6)
Large Reserve Accumulation 26 37 23 86
(% of Group Total) (48.1) (55.2) (67.6) (55.5)
Sources: IFS, WDI, Authors’ Calculations
Table 3: Capital Inflows Episodes, Reversals, & Sudden Stops
Advanced Emerging Other
Economies Economies Economies Total
Total Episodes: 54 67 34 155
Of which:
Ending in Reversal 45 53 24 122
(% of Group Total) (83.3) (79.1) (70.6) (78.7)
Of which:
Ending in Sudden Stop 19 19 4 42
(% of Group Total) (35.2) (28.4) (11.8) (27.1)
Sources: IFS, WDI, Authors’ Calculations
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3 Event Study
3.1 Aggregate Economic Variables
In this section we characterize the behavior of several macroeconomic variables during a
typical episode of large capital inflows. To this end, we compute the mean and median path
of a set of macroeconomic indicators across all our episodes. In order to capture both the
buildup and end phase of each episode, we consider nine-year windows that begin two years
before the start of each inflows episode. In general, this window captures the point at which
the variables first diverge from their trend level as well as the trough of the post-boom drop.
As we saw in the previous section, many of the episodes in our sample occur in the late
2000s, and thus a full six years of data are not available after the end of these episodes.
To ensure that the patterns we uncover in this section do not reflect mere changes in the
composition of the sample, we include here only episodes for which a full nine years of data
are available.
As is standard in much of the literature (e.g. Gourinchas et al., 2001; Mendoza and Terrones,
2008; Cardarelli et al., 2010), we focus on the cyclical component of each variable by looking
at the deviations from an HP trend. In each of the graphs in this section, time zero marks
the start of the episodes. Vertical lines mark the start and the average length of an inflows
episode, which is just over three years.15
Figure 5 paints a stark picture of how domestic variables behave during a typical episode
of large capital inflows. First, large inflows are associated with an economic boom. In fact,
at the peak of the typical episode GDP is around 2 percentage points above trend. The
boom is driven by a significant rise in consumption, and by an even more marked increase in
investment. The boom is also accompanied by a significant rise in private credit, suggesting
the existence of a link between capital inflows and access to credit by the private sector.
Both a rise in employment and in measured TFP contribute to the increase in production.
However, since we measure TFP using a Solow residual, we cannot distinguish whether the
rise in TFP is due to an improvement in productivity, or to increased capacity utilization
during the economic boom that accompanies episodes of large capital inflows.16
In contrast with the boom taking place during the inflows, the aftermath of the typical
episode of large capital inflows is characterized by an economic contraction. In fact, beginning
15This is slightly shorter than the average length in Table 1 because here we include only episodes with
complete data.
16See Basu and Fernald (2001) for the evidence on the procyclicality of capacity utilization and the chal-
lenges it poses for measuring TFP over the business cycle.
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Figure 5: Capital Inflows Episodes and the Domestic Economy
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with the fourth, or fifth in the case of private credit, year after the start of the episode all the
variables, apart from TFP, fall significantly below trend. Employment exhibits a particularly
large fall, since the magnitude of its drop below trend after the end of the episode is larger
than the pickup occurring at the start of the episode. This pattern suggests that the return
of capital inflows to their long run trend might cause economic disruption, a point on which
we will return in section 4.2.
Figure 6: Capital Inflows Episodes and the External Sector
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Figure 6 examines the path of external variables during episodes of large capital inflows.
Large capital inflows coincide with an appreciation of the real exchange rate, represented
by a rise in the index plotted in Figure 6, peaking at just over two percent above its trend
level late in the episode. This finding is consistent with the real exchange rate appreciations
associated with credit booms (e.g. Gourinchas et al., 2001; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008),
and with exchange-rate-based stabilization programs (Ve´gh, 1992; Rebelo and Vegh, 1995),
which constitute a subset of the episodes we study here. The real exchange rate remains
above its trend value for approximately five years, or two years longer than the length of an
average episode. The current account deficit goes from an average of just under two percent
of GDP prior to start of the episode to between five and six percent in the first two years
after the start of the episode, before returning to its original level after five years. At the
same time, foreign reserves increase in the period before the start of the episode to fall back
to 1% above trend during the average length of the episode.17 Hence, on average, the impact
of the capital inflows on the current account is only partially oﬀset by the accumulation of
reserves by the central bank.
17We measure reserve accumulation using the net change in oﬃcial reserves from the balance of payments,
which gives the increase in reserves net of valuation changes.
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Figure 7: Capital Inflows Episodes and International Conditions
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In Figure 7, we look at the international liquidity conditions during episodes of large capital
inflows, as captured by two measures of financial conditions in the US. First, we take the
US real interest rate as a proxy for the international interest rate. The typical episode is
preceded by a period of low interest rates, with the real Fed Funds rate significantly below
its HP trend. The US interest rate then rises to or slightly above its trend level, although
the standard error bands indicate that the level of interest rates during these episodes varies
substantially. We do not investigate here whether low international interest rates have a
causal role in generating episodes of large capital inflows. However, the pattern of low
rates preceding such episodes is consistent with panel data evidence from Fratzscher (2012)
that U.S. interest rates are an important driver of portfolio flows, as well as with the VAR
analyses by Bruno and Shin (2013) and Rey (2013) showing that lower U.S. interest rates
drive increases in cross-border lending by banks.
Second, we test whether prevalent attitudes towards risk in major financial markets vary
around the episodes that we identify, using the VIX index as a measure of risk aversion
(Figure 7, right panel). As the episode begins, the VIX is on average below its long run
average (the horizontal line in the graph), indicating that risk aversion is lower than usual
when episodes begin. Risk aversion rises during the first two years before returning to its
long run average around the time the typical episode ends.18 As with global interest rates,
we do not examine in detail whether risk appetite is a cause of inflows episodes, but we
do note that the pattern we uncover is consistent with the findings of Forbes and Warnock
(2012) and Fratzscher (2012) as well as Rey (2013), who present evidence of a causal role
18We observe the same pattern if we employ an alternate measure of risk such as the spread between the
yield on medium-grade corporate bonds (rated Baa by Moody’s) and that on highly rated (Aaa) corporate
bonds.
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for changes in risk appetite in driving cross-border capital flows.
3.2 Sectoral Allocation of Production
Having characterized the aggregate behavior of the economy during our episodes, we now
turn our attention to the sectoral allocation of production. In particular, we are interested in
documenting how the composition of GDP and the allocation of productive resources across
diﬀerent sectors behave during large capital inflows. As was the case with the macroeconomic
variables we examined, we detrend the sectoral shares using an HP filter, because these
exhibit clear time trends in nearly all countries in the sample. In advanced economies, the
sectoral shares of tradables in general, and manufacturing in particular, fall steadily over
time, reflecting a structural shift towards services. By contrast, the importance of tradables
and manufacturing rises steadily over time in most emerging and developing economies.
Figure 8 plots changes in the shares of gross value added produced by four sectors: agricul-
ture, mining, services, and manufacturing. In the top left panel, we see that the share of
agriculture in value added drops significantly during the typical episode and returns to its
trend level when the episode ends. To the extent that agricultural products are tradable,
this is consistent with two-sector small open economy models in which a consumption boom
is accompanied by a shift in production towards nontradable goods.19 However, the top right
panel of Figure 8 provides some evidence that the share of mining rises above trend during
episodes of large capital inflows. Since metals and hydrocarbons are tradable goods, this
appears at odds with the idea that capital inflows episodes are associated with a shift out
of tradables production. At the same time, the data show substantial heterogeneity, with
particularly wide confidence intervals. We therefore suspect that some of the episodes in
our sample correspond to periods in which funds from abroad are used to finance the devel-
opment of mineral resources. Again consistent with the theoretical literature, the share of
value added in services is on average slightly below its trend level before the episode begins,
then rises to its trend level or slightly above for the duration of the typical episode. Finally,
manufacturing value added is at or above its trend level at the start of these episodes, but
drops steadily for four years before beginning to return to trend.
The fall in manufacturing value added is consistent with, among others, Rebelo and Vegh
(1995), Rodrik (2008), and Kalantzis (2014) who find that manufacturing value added typ-
ically falls during episodes of real exchange rate appreciation. However, precisely during
19See Rebelo and Vegh (1995) and Benigno and Fornaro (2014).
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Figure 8: Capital Inflows Episodes and Sectoral Allocation of Value Added
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Note: t=0 at start of capital inflows episode. Vertical lines mark start and average duration of episodes.
Sources: IMF BoPS, WDI, UNIDO, ILO
Mean Median One SE Band
periods of real exchange rate overvaluation, the sectoral share of real value added may not
give reliable information on the sectoral allocation of productive resources. Consider an
episode of real appreciation. The domestic price level rises faster than the foreign price level,
but the price of tradable goods will move together with international prices more closely
than will the price of nontradable goods. As a result, episodes of real appreciation will tend
to be periods in which the price of nontradables like services rises faster than the price of
tradables like manufacturing. However, as discussed in Section 2, standard practice when
using sectoral data for a wide sample of countries (including the WDI data we use here)
is to deflate all sectors using the GDP deflator, due to the limited availability of data on
sectoral price changes.20 As a result, real value added in tradables, including agriculture and
manufacturing, will mechanically tend to grow more slowly than real value added in services
during periods of real appreciation.
To have a better sense of how capital inflows aﬀect sectoral production, we therefore look at
the sectoral allocation of productive resources during the episodes we study. This allows us
to determine the extent to which production is truly shifting, irrespective of movements in
output prices. In particular, we examine employment in the manufacturing sector as a share
20An exception is Kalantzis (2014), who uses sectoral price deflators for a narrower sample of countries.
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Figure 9: Capital Inflows Episodes and Sectoral Allocation of Resources
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of total employment and investment in manufacturing as a share of total investment. Here
we limit our analysis to manufacturing in order to maximize the number of capital inflows
episodes included in the analysis, since data on the shares of employment and investment
allocated to agriculture, mining, and services are not widely available.
Figure 9 makes clear that the share of productive resources allocated to manufacturing
drops during episodes of large capital inflows. In fact, while the share of manufacturing
in both employment and investment is above trend when the episode begins, by the end
of the episode both shares are significantly below trend. Hence, Figure 9 provides direct
evidence of a reallocation of productive resources out of manufacturing, and presumably
into nontradable sectors, during episodes of large capital inflows. In this sense, of the two
country cases highlighted in the introduction to this paper, the case of Spain rather than
that of Brazil is typical of countries experiencing unusually large capital inflows.
We now consider whether the reallocation of resources across sectors is connected with two
other dimensions: the extent to which the government accumulates foreign reserves during
the episode, and the international liquidity conditions when the episode begins. Let us
start with the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by the central bank. Standard
two-sector small open economy models predict that the allocation of productive resources
between tradable and nontradable sectors should respond to changes in the current account,
rather than to capital inflows per se.21 Hence, theory suggests that, to the extent that
21See Rebelo and Vegh (1995) and Benigno and Fornaro (2014). See also Benigno and Fornaro (2012),
which present a theoretical framework in which the accumulation of reserves by the central bank induces a
21
Figure 10: Capital Inflows Episodes and Sectoral Allocation, High and Low Reserve
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reserve accumulation by the central bank oﬀsets the impact of capital inflows on the current
account, we should expect the reallocation of resources out of manufacturing to be larger,
when the accumulation of reserves by the central bank during an episode is smaller.
Motivated by this insight, we compare the behavior of the share of employment in manu-
facturing in episodes with below-average reserve accumulation to those with above average
reserve accumulation.22 The results are illustrated by Figure 10. Where reserve accumula-
tion is below average, the share of employment in manufacturing is on average at or slightly
above trend when the episode begins, but drops significantly below trend during the second
and third year of the episode before moving back towards its trent level four years after the
episode begins. Moreover, the magnitude of the drop is much larger than was the case for
the entire sample. By contrast, episodes in which reserve accumulation is above average
show a rise in the share of employment in manufacturing as the episode begins. The share
then moves gradually back towards its trend level.23 Hence, the behavior of the share of em-
ployment in manufacturing suggests that the accumulation of reserves by the central bank
might mitigate the contraction in manufacturing during episodes of large capital inflows, in
line with the predictions of standard two-sectors small open economy models. The behavior
shift of resources toward the tradable sector.
22Once again we measure reserve accumulation using the net change in oﬃcial reserves from the balance
of payments, which gives the increase in reserves net of valuation changes.
23These patterns hold when the median rather than the mean is used to divide episodes, and regardless
of whether reserve accumulation is normalized by GDP or by the level of capital inflows.
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Figure 11: Capital Inflows Episodes and Sectoral Allocation, High and Low International
Interest Rates
−.
4
−.
2
0
.2
.4
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Below Average Fed Funds Rate
−.
4
−.
2
0
.2
.4
−2 −1 0 1 2 3 4 5 6
Above Average Fed Funds Rate
Pe
rc
en
ta
ge
 P
oin
ts 
De
via
tio
n 
fro
m
 H
P 
Tr
en
d
Note: t=0 at start of inflows episode; Sources: IMF, World Bank, UNIDO
Employment in Manufacturing and International Interest Rates
Mean Median  SE Band
of manufacturing investment, on the other hand, shows no divergence between episodes with
low versus high reserve accumulation (to conserve space, we do not include these graphs).
We now turn to the role of the international liquidity conditions at the onset of the episodes
that we identify. In general, easy access to credit from abroad generates a boom in con-
sumption. While the increase in tradable consumption results in a current account deficit,
nontradable consumption requires a shift of resources out of the tradable sector and into the
production of nontradables (see Rebelo and Vegh, 1995; Benigno and Fornaro, 2014, for a
detailed theoretical exploration of this mechanism). So the sectoral allocation of productive
resources can be driven also by international financial conditions.
Figure 11 compares the behavior of the share of employment in manufacturing in episodes
characterized by below-average Federal Funds rate at the start of the episode, to those with
above average Federal Funds rate. The left panel shows that, for those episodes that were
preceded by below average Federal Funds rates, manufacturing employment drops through-
out the duration of the typical episode before beginning to recover. Instead, where the Feds
Funds rate is high when the episode begins, the share of manufacturing employment rises
significantly before returning to its trend level around the time the typical episode ends. In
addition, a nearly identical pattern emerges if we divide the episodes according to the level
of the VIX just before the start of each episode (see Appendix B). Where risk aversion is low
at the outset manufacturing employment drops, while where risk aversion is above average,
manufacturing employment rises. Hence, the reallocation of employment out of manufac-
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turing seems to be a feature of those episodes that take oﬀ when international liquidity is
abundant.
In the first part of this section, we showed that on average productive resources shift out
of manufacturing during episodes of large capital inflows, and indeed the reallocation of in-
vestment out of manufacturing appears to be a general feature of period in which capital
inflows are unusually large. However, we also find that the reallocation of employment out of
manufacturing is not a universal feature of the episodes in our sample. Rather, employment
shifts out of manufacturing during episodes in which reserve accumulation has been rela-
tively low but moves very little in cases where governments actively purchase foreign assets.
Employment also shifts out of manufacturing during episodes which begin at times of abun-
dant international liquidity. In the next two sections, we show that this distinction–episodes
in which reallocation occurs versus those where it does not—is particularly important, be-
cause the allocation of employment is significantly related to how the economy fares in the
aftermath of large capital inflows.
4 The Aftermath of Large Capital Inflows
4.1 Capital Flow Reversals and Sudden Stops
Policymakers often cite the risk that an episode of large capital inflows might create the
conditions for a financial crisis and a recession as one of the key reasons why it is necessary
to monitor and intervene in capital flows. In fact, the event study in Section 3 showed that
on average episodes of large capital inflows set up the stage for a slump. In this section,
we ask whether the behavior of several macroeconomic indicators, and in particular of the
sectoral allocation of production, before or during the episode can provide any information
about whether the episode is likely to end in a hard or a soft landing. We begin by testing
how various economic variables are related to two broad measures of the outcome of each
episode: Whether or not the episode coincides with a reversal or a sudden stop.24
We model the probability that a sudden stop will occur during or immediately after episode
i using a probit specification in which yi is equal to one if a reversal (regression 1 in Table 4)
or a sudden stop (regression 2) occurs during episode i or in the year immediately afterwards.
The results are nearly identical if we employ a linear probability model or a logistic regression
24As in Section 2 we identify sudden stops using the methodology of Calvo et al. (2004).
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model (these results are provided in Appendix B).
Pr(yi = 1|Xi) = Φ (γ1INFLOWSi + γ2CREDITi (1)
+γ ′3ALLOCATIONi + γ
′
4FED FUNDSi + γ
′
5POLICYi)
Since episodes of large inflows are associated with credit booms, we first examine whether
the size of the credit boom aﬀects the probability of a sudden stop or reversal. In particular,
we include in the regression the variable CREDITi, the average value of HP-detrended real
credit to the private sector during the episode i. The variable INFLOWSi is the average
value of our HP-detrended capital capital inflows measure (the current account deficit plus
reserve accumulation) during the episode.
The vector ALLOCATIONi contains two variables: the average share of manufacturing in
total employment during the episode and the average share of manufacturing investment,
measured as share of total investment. Once again, we measure the allocation variables as
the deviation from their HP trends. In the previous section, we found that episodes of large
capital inflows coincided with larger than normal shifts of resources out of the manufacturing
sector. Here we examine whether these shifts render the economy vulnerable to a sudden
stop.
The event study also indicated that the real federal funds rate was on average lower than
its trend level just before episodes of large inflows. Therefore FED FUNDSi is a vector of
two variables: the average US eﬀective Federal Funds rate, in real terms, in the three years
prior to the start of each episode and the average value of the real Fed Funds rate during
each episode.
Finally, we include a vector of four variables (POLICYi) capturing the policies in place
before and during these episodes. To test whether policy-makers can eﬀectively guard against
sudden stops by accumulating foreign reserves once capital inflows grow unusually large, we
include the average purchase of new reserves during the episode, measured as a share of
GDP.25 We also examine whether holding a pre-existing stockpile of foreign reserves can
benefit the economy by including in the regression the level of foreign reserves before the
episode starts. Finally, we include a dummy variable equal to one if the country has a floating
exchange rate regime at the start of the episode (constructed using data from Ilzetzki et al.,
2008, and updated through 2012) as well as the Chinn-Ito measure of financial openness
when the episode begins (Chinn and Ito, 2006).
25We use the change in reserves from the balance of payments, which captures the change in reserves net
of valuation changes.
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Table 4: Probit Regression Results
Episode Characteristics, Reversals, and Sudden Stops
Dependent Variable: Reversal Sudden Stop
(1) (2)
Capital Inflows1 0.086 0.141*
(0.072) (0.076)
Private Credit2 -0.007 0.052***
(0.014) (0.019)
Manuf. Employment3 -0.181 -0.496
(0.424) (0.532)
Manuf. Investment3 -0.062 0.101
(0.142) (0.163)
Fed Funds Rate4 0.08 0.135
(0.091) (0.108)
Fed Funds Rate4 0.123 -0.214**
Before Episode (0.09) (0.103)
Reserve Accumulation5 -0.143* 0.026
(0.086) (0.096)
Initial Reserves5 0.035** -0.105***
(0.016) (0.031)
Floating ER6 -0.382 -0.832**
(0.349) (0.423)
Financial Openness7 -0.009 0.187
(0.106) (0.14)
Observations 91 91
Pseudo R-Squared 0.097 0.396
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. 1Percentage
points deviation from HP trend. 2Real, per capita terms; log deviation from HP
trend. 3Share of total, percentage points deviation from HP trend. 4Percentage
Points. 5Percent of GDP. 6Dummy for floating exchange rate regime, based on Ilzet-
zki et al. (2008). 7Chinn-Ito index of financial openness. Pre- and post-peak values
are averages for 3 years before and after the year capital inflows peak. See the Ap-
pendix for data sources.
The regression results reported in Table 4 show that the variables we consider do not provide
much information on whether the episode will coincide with a reversal of capital inflows.
Although reserve accumulation and the level of reserves appear statistically significant, the
model fit as captured by the pseudo R-squared is poor. Thus, it appears that neither
the domestic or foreign macroeconomic conditions we consider, nor the policy variables we
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analyze, are systematically related to whether large inflows will end abruptly or smoothly.
By contrast, the model appears much more informative about whether the episodes we ex-
amine will coincide with a sudden stop. A larger expansion of domestic credit is significantly
associated with an increased probability of a sudden stop.26 Even controlling for domestic
credit, the capital inflows variable is also significantly related to the probability of sudden
stops. This suggests that the presence of unusually large capital inflows puts the economy
more at risk of a sudden stop than does a purely domestic credit expansion. This is consis-
tent with the work of Caballero (2014) who finds that surges in capital inflows increase the
risk of banking crisis even in the absence of a lending boom.
We also find that episodes of capital inflows that start when the Fed Funds rate is low are
more likely to end up in a sudden stop. Moreover, although reserve accumulation during
the episode does not enter significantly, a higher pre-episode level of reserves is significantly
associated with lower vulnerability to a sudden stop. Finally, a floating exchange rate sig-
nificantly reduces the probability that a sudden stop will occur. Instead, we do not find
evidence of an impact on the likelihood that a sudden stop occurs from the extent to which
productive resources are reallocated across sectors during the inflows.
4.2 Economic Performance when Capital Flows Fall
We now investigate the relationship between, on the one hand, what happens before and
during large capital inflows and, on the other, macroeconomic performance in the aftermath
of the episode. We saw in the previous section that macroeconomic and policy variables
provided some information about the risk that a sudden stop would occur, and the literature
has indeed shown that sudden stops have significant negative consequences for economic
performance (Calvo and Reinhart, 2000; Gourinchas and Obstfeld, 2012). However, more
than 70 percent of the episodes in our sample do not end in a sudden stop. We therefore
estimate the following model
yi = α + β1INFLOWSi + β2CREDITi + (2)
β′3ALLOCATIONi + β
′
4FED FUNDSi + β
′
5POLICYi + εi
26Gourinchas and Obstfeld (2012) find that credit expansion increases the probability of both banking
and currency crises in emerging markets, but to a lesser extent in EMEs. Thus our work confirms that this
credit-crisis relationship holds once we restrict our sample to periods of large capital inflows. citeCR2000
document the close relationship between sudden stops and banking crisis.
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Where the dependent variable yi,t is the average of a measure of economic performance after
the end of episode i. The dependent variables we consider are the average values of GDP,
consumption, investment, employment, and TFP (all HP detrended) during the three years
after the end of the episode.
We use the same set of explanatory variables as in the previous section. We first ex-
amine whether the extent of the credit boom (CREDITi) or the size of capital inflows
(INFLOWSi) aﬀect economic outcomes after the episode. In the Section 3, we found that
episodes of large capital inflows coincided with larger than normal shifts of employment and
investment out of the manufacturing sector. Here we examine whether these shifts (again
measured by the vector ALLOCATIONi) adversely aﬀect economic performance after cap-
ital inflows come to an end. As in our analysis of sudden stops, FED FUNDSi includes
the average US eﬀective Federal Funds rate in both the three years prior to the start of each
episode and during each episode.27 And we again include a vector of variables POLICYi
capturing the policies in place before and during these episodes, including reserve accumula-
tion during the episode, the level of reserves before the start of the episode, and the exchange
rate regime and degree of de jure capital openness in place when the episode begins.
The coeﬃcients on capital inflows in table 5 are always negative and generally significant.
This indicates that the size of the capital inflows the economy receives during the episode is
systematically related to how the economy fares once inflows come to an end. A larger credit
boom during the episode also has a negative relationship with post-episode macroeconomic
outcomes. This confirms that the episodes we examine are typical of credit booms more
generally. However the capital inflows variable is significant even after we control for the size
of the domestic credit boom. Therefore the negative impact of the booms in our sample on
post-episode output is significantly larger than would be the case during a purely domestic
credit boom.
The positive and significant coeﬃcient on the share of manufacturing employment in regres-
sion (1) indicates that less reallocation of employment away from manufacturing during the
episode is significantly associated with a less severe recession afterwards.28 Likewise, less
reallocation away from manufacturing is associated with higher consumption, investment,
and employment. By contrast, Table 5 shows no systematic relationship between the share of
total investment allocated to manufacturing during episodes of large inflows and subsequent
27Results are nearly identical if we use the VIX index as a measure of international liquidity conditions.
See Appendix B
28In a large majority of the episodes in our sample, the share of labor the manufacturing sector falls below
its trend (refer back to Figure 9). When discussing our results we therefore interpret coeﬃcients as estimates
of the impact of reallocation out of manufacturing.
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economic performance.
Table 5: Regression Results
Episode Characteristics and Economic Performance
Dependent Variable: GDP1 Consumption1 Investment2 Employment2 TFP2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Capital Inflows2 -0.159 -0.474*** -0.665* -0.075 -0.293**
(0.119) (0.139) (0.383) (0.111) (0.122)
Private Credit1 -0.069*** -0.041 -0.260*** -0.033* -0.059***
(0.024) (0.032) (0.086) (0.019) (0.016)
Manuf. Employment3 1.499*** 1.812** 3.814** 1.273** -0.201
(0.548) (0.744) (1.896) (0.557) (0.438)
Manuf. Investment3 -0.136 -0.078 -0.513 0.034 0.061
(0.232) (0.221) (0.807) (0.283) (0.206)
Fed Funds Rate4 -0.151 -0.06 0.195 0.065 -0.001
(0.134) (0.152) (0.528) (0.124) (0.145)
Fed Funds Rate4 0.138 0.212 0.419 0.201 0.179
Before Episode (0.122) (0.128) (0.442) (0.133) (0.111)
Reserve Accumulation5 0.188 0.314* 1.203*** 0.093 0.392***
(0.127) (0.164) (0.42) (0.129) (0.133)
Initial Reserves5 0.008 -0.018 -0.063 0.01 0.012
(0.026) (0.022) (0.082) (0.024) (0.018)
Floating ER6 0.644 0.53 3.603** 0.974** 0.257
(0.408) (0.468) (1.498) (0.45) (0.432)
Financial Openness7 -0.098 0.058 -0.268 -0.1 0.181
(0.155) (0.188) (0.594) (0.159) (0.179)
Observations 91 90 87 83 83
R-Squared 0.356 0.336 0.447 0.258 0.483
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables are
average values for the 3 years after each episode ends. 1Real, per capita terms; log deviation
from HP trend. 2Percentage points deviation from HP trend. 3Share of total, percentage points
deviation from HP trend. 4Percentage Points. 5Percent of GDP. 6Dummy for floating exchange
rate regime, based on Ilzetzki et al. (2008). 7Chinn-Ito index of financial openness. See the Ap-
pendix for data sources.
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These findings suggest that, once we control for other relevant factors, the sectoral allocation
of labor is significantly related to economic performance in the post-boom period. These
findings are related to the analysis of Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010), who discuss the impor-
tance of the sectoral allocation of production for current account sustainability. However,
our results indicate that the allocation of labor is more informative regarding post-episode
performance than the sectoral allocation of investment.29
International liquidity conditions as measured by the Fed Funds rate do not appear signifi-
cantly related to economic performance after the episode ends. Thus our results indicate that
abundant international liquidity does not significantly aﬀect macroeconomic variables once
we control for the two channels through which it might aﬀect the domestic economy—capital
inflows and domestic credit conditions. Moreover, we saw in Section 3 that the extent of
reallocation of employment away from manufacturing is greater in episodes that start dur-
ing periods of low U.S. interest rates. Sectoral reallocation thus appears to be another
channel through which abundant international liquidity aﬀects macroeconomic outcomes in
these episodes, but once we account for reallocation, U.S. interest rates themselves have no
independent impact.
Turning to the policy variables in our regression, reserve accumulation during episodes of
large inflows is always positively related to post-episode macroeconomic outcomes, and nearly
always significantly so. By contrast, the level of oﬃcial reserves prior to the start of the
episode is never significant and fluctuates in sign. Moreover, the evidence for the eﬀectiveness
of the other two policy measures we study is not particularly strong. A floating exchange
rate is positively associated with post-episode performance, but significantly related only to
investment and employment. Financial openness at the start of the episode, on the other
hand, does not appear to aﬀect subsequent economic performance.
The relatively parsimonious specification we employ explains between one third and one half
of the variation in the macroeconomic outcomes we analyze, and the size of the coeﬃcients in
Table 5 are economically meaningful. For instance, in the mid-2000s Ireland experienced an
episode of large capital inflows, during which employment in the manufacturing sector ran 0.4
percentage points below its HP trend. According to the results in Table 5, this reallocation of
labor is typically associated in the aftermath of the inflows with GDP being 0.6 percentage
29This result might be due to frictions to the reallocation of labor across sectors once the inflows subside.
For instance, the combination of nominal wage rigidities and a fixed exchange rate prevents the fall in real
wages that might be needed to reallocate labor in the tradable sectors in the aftermath of an episode of large
capital inflows, and thus generate unemployment (see Schmitt-Grohe´ and Uribe (2011) and Fornaro (2012)).
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points lower that it would have been without such reallocation, and investment being a
1.5 percent lower. Like the Eurozone periphery, countries in Eastern Europe received large
capital inflows during the mid-2000s. In these countries (Poland, Hungary, Bulgaria, and
the Baltic Republics) the share of the labor force in manufacturing actually rose to between
0.6 and 0.9 percentage points above its trend. Our results imply that this reallocation
would typically coincide with post-episode GDP 0.9 and 1.3 percent higher than without
reallocation, investment two or three percent higher, and employment between 0.8 and 1.1
percent higher.
Of course, from our simple empirical model it is not possible to draw conclusions about
the channels that generate a correlation between the share of employment in manufacturing
and the behavior of macroeconomic variables in the aftermath of an episode of large capital
inflows, nor about the directions of causality. However, we think that the relationships un-
covered by this empirical analysis are suggestive enough to warrant further research, perhaps
aiming at empirically testing some of the channels suggested by the theoretical literature.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the experiences of 69 middle- and high-income countries that un-
derwent episodes of large capital inflows between 1975 and 2010. A large majority of these
episodes end in a sharp reversal of capital inflows, but less than a third of these reversals are
sudden stops in which output contracts.
Our event study shows that in the typical episode output rises initially but then drops
below trend as capital inflows subside. This is also true of investment, consumption, and
employment. A credit boom also accompanies the episodes in our sample, collapsing when
the episodes end. Aggregate productivity follows a similar path, remaining below its trend
level for more than three years after the episode ends. The episodes that we identify typically
begin in years when US interest rates are below average and when risk appetite in US financial
markets is higher than average.
Large capital inflows also coincide with a shift of both labor and capital out of the man-
ufacturing sector. While the reallocation of investment is a general feature of episodes of
large capital inflows, the reallocation of labor away from manufacturing is a phenomenon
particular to episodes in which the accumulation of reserves by the central bank is low, as
well as to episodes that begin during periods of abundant international liquidity.
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Our regression analysis reveals that post-episode economic performance is significantly and
negatively related not only to the size of the credit boom generated by capital inflows and the
magnitude of those inflows, but also the extent to which labor moves out of manufacturing,
with a stronger shift of labor out of manufacturing during the inflows episode associated with
a sharper contraction in the aftermath of the episode. By contrast, international liquidity
conditions and the allocation of investment are uninformative regarding the severity and
length of the post-boom downturn.
Our findings therefore indicate that policy-makers should monitor the sectoral allocation of
labor during periods of exceptionally large capital inflows. In fact, a shift in employment out
of manufacturing may signal increased risk of a hard landing. However, on a positive note,
our results also indicate that foreign exchange reserves management might help policymakers
in dealing with the labor reallocation out of manufacturing during episodes of large capital
inflows.
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Appendix A: Data Appendix
Data Sources
Table A-1: Data Sources
Variable Source
Current Account IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
Reserves IMF Balance of Payments Statistics
Eﬀective Fed Funds Rate FRED
Baa-Aaa Corporate Bond Spread FRED
VXO Index Bloomberg
Real Exchange Rate WDI
Output WDI
Consumption WDI
Investment WDI
Credit to the Private Sector WDI
Tradables Value-Added WDI
Nontradables Value-Added WDI
Total Employment ILO LABORSTA
Manufacturing Employment UNIDO INDSTAT2
Manufacturing Investment UNIDO INDSTAT2
TFP Penn World Tables
Exchange Rate Regime Ilzetzki, Reinhart, & Rogoﬀ (2008)
Capital Controls Chinn & Ito (2006)
Notes on the Construction of Selected Data Series
Total Factor Productivity: We calculate total factor productivity (TFP) using data on
output and investment obtained from the Penn World Tables (Heston et al., 2013). We
estimate initial capital stock using the method described in Klenow and Rodr´ıguez-Clare
(1997) and calculate capital stock for subsequent years using the annual values of investment
obtained from the PennWorld Tables. We use employment data from the International Labor
Organization’s LABORSTA data set rather than the labor force data provided by the Penn
World Tables. This ensures that fluctuations in TFP around episodes of large capital inflows
are not the result of changes in the unemployment rate. We calculate aggregate total factor
productivity using standard growth accounting (e.g. as in Benhabib and Spiegel, 2005). This
methodology allows us to measure TFP in nearly all of the 69 countries in which we observe
episodes of large capital inflows.
The VIX: To measure the risk aversion of major international investors we use the VIX
index. The VIX measures the implied volatility of S&P index options and thus reflects the
price of risk in U.S. equity markets. When the price of risk and thus the VIX is low, it can
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be inferred that risk aversion is low. More specifically, we use the “original” VIX index or
VXO, which measures the implied volatility of options on the S&P100 and which is available
since the late 1980s. To obtain a measure of risk aversion from 1970 to 1986 we regress the
realized volatility of the S&P 100 on the VXO for the post-1986 period and use the estimated
coeﬃcients to back-cast the VXO.
List of Episodes
Table A-2: Capital Inflows Episodes in Advanced Economies
Ave. Curr. Acct.
Country Start Year Peak Year End Year Episode Length Deficit (%GDP)
United Kingdom 1987 1990 1990 4.0 3.7
Austria 1975 1979 1981 7.0 3.6
Austria 1995 1997 1998 4.0 2.5
Belgium 2008 2009 2009 2.0 1.0
Denmark 1985 1986 1987 3.0 4.2
Denmark 1997 1998 1999 3.0 -0.4
Denmark 2008 2008 2009 2.0 -3.2
France 1980 1981 1983 4.0 1.1
France 2006 2008 2008 3.0 1.1
Germany 1978 1979 1982 5.0 0.2
Germany 1991 1993 1995 5.0 1.2
Germany 1998 2002 2003 6.0 -0.0
Italy 1980 1981 1981 2.0 2.4
Italy 1988 1988 1991 4.0 1.4
Italy 2006 2009 2011 6.0 2.7
Netherlands 1977 1979 1980 4.0 -0.1
Netherlands 1992 1993 1993 2.0 -3.0
Netherlands 2000 2001 2002 3.0 -2.3
Netherlands 2008 2009 2009 2.0 -4.8
Norway 1976 1976 1977 2.0 11.4
Norway 1987 1988 1988 2.0 4.2
Norway 1996 1997 1999 4.0 -4.7
Sweden 1975 1976 1977 3.0 1.5
Sweden 1990 1991 1993 4.0 2.4
Canada 1975 1977 1978 4.0 3.9
Canada 1987 1989 1989 3.0 3.3
Canada 1998 1999 1999 2.0 0.5
Canada 2009 2010 2010 2.0 3.2
Japan 1980 1981 1981 2.0 0.3
Japan 1995 1995 1996 2.0 -1.7
Japan 2003 2004 2004 2.0 -3.4
Finland 1990 1993 1994 5.0 3.1
Greece 1999 1999 2000 2.0 6.7
Greece 2006 2010 2011 6.0 12.0
Ireland 1980 1982 1982 3.0 10.7
Ireland 1993 1994 1995 3.0 -2.9
Ireland 2006 2009 2009 4.0 4.2
Source: IMF, Authors’ Calculations
38
Table A-2: Capital Inflows Episodes in Advanced Economies (continued)
Ave. Curr. Acct.
Country Start Year Peak Year End Year Episode Length Deficit (%GDP)
Portugal 1981 1982 1982 2.0 12.8
Portugal 1989 1990 1991 3.0 0.3
Portugal 2008 2009 2010 3.0 11.4
Spain 1987 1988 1991 5.0 2.2
Spain 2005 2005 2008 4.0 9.0
Australia 1981 1983 1983 3.0 4.3
Australia 1986 1987 1990 5.0 5.1
Australia 2003 2004 2006 4.0 6.2
New Zealand 1984 1985 1986 3.0 11.4
New Zealand 2005 2005 2007 3.0 7.0
Cyprus 1982 1983 1984 3.0 9.2
Cyprus 1989 1991 1992 4.0 6.2
Cyprus 1999 2000 2001 3.0 3.4
Cyprus 2005 2007 2008 4.0 9.1
Israel 1982 1983 1983 2.0 8.9
Israel 1993 1994 1997 5.0 4.3
Israel 2008 2010 2010 3.0 -2.8
Source: IMF, Authors’ Calculations
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Table A-3: Capital Inflows Episodes in Emerging Economies
Ave. Curr. Acct.
Country Start Year Peak Year End Year Episode Length Deficit (%GDP)
Turkey 1993 1994 1997 5.0 1.1
Turkey 2005 2007 2007 3.0 5.4
South Africa 1975 1976 1976 2.0 5.9
South Africa 1981 1983 1984 4.0 3.2
South Africa 1995 1996 1997 3.0 1.4
South Africa 2004 2005 2008 5.0 5.2
Argentina 1997 2000 2000 4.0 3.4
Argentina 2004 2006 2007 4.0 -2.3
Brazil 1995 1996 1996 2.0 2.6
Brazil 2000 2000 2001 2.0 4.0
Brazil 2007 2008 2011 5.0 1.5
Chile 1978 1979 1981 4.0 8.6
Chile 1990 1991 1997 8.0 2.8
Colombia 1981 1981 1982 2.0 6.6
Colombia 1993 1994 1997 5.0 4.7
El Salvador 1981 1982 1982 2.0 5.4
El Salvador 1989 1990 1990 2.0 3.8
El Salvador 2007 2007 2008 2.0 6.6
Mexico 1980 1980 1981 2.0 5.9
Mexico 1990 1990 1993 4.0 4.7
Peru 1994 1997 1997 4.0 7.1
Peru 2007 2009 2012 6.0 1.9
Lebanon 2008 2008 2009 2.0 16.7
Egypt 1979 1980 1982 4.0 6.6
Egypt 2005 2006 2010 6.0 -0.1
India 2006 2006 2007 2.0 0.8
Indonesia 1995 1995 1996 2.0 3.3
Korea 1979 1981 1981 3.0 6.2
Korea 1991 1993 1996 6.0 1.4
Korea 2009 2010 2011 3.0 -2.6
Malaysia 1981 1981 1983 3.0 11.4
Malaysia 1991 1991 1993 3.0 5.5
Malaysia 2003 2003 2004 2.0 -12.1
Pakistan 1992 1995 1996 5.0 5.1
Pakistan 2006 2008 2009 4.0 5.5
Philippines 1978 1981 1982 5.0 6.1
Philippines 1991 1995 1996 6.0 3.6
Philippines 2010 2011 2011 2.0 -3.1
Thailand 1989 1989 1991 3.0 6.6
Thailand 1994 1994 1996 3.0 7.2
Thailand 2005 2009 2010 6.0 -2.6
Vietnam 2007 2008 2008 2.0 9.9
Morocco 1976 1976 1977 2.0 15.4
Morocco 1981 1981 1982 2.0 12.0
Morocco 1990 1991 1991 2.0 1.1
Morocco 1999 2000 2001 3.0 -0.9
Tunisia 1977 1978 1978 2.0 9.4
Tunisia 1982 1983 1984 3.0 8.1
Tunisia 1992 1994 1994 3.0 6.5
Source: IMF, Authors’ Calculations
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Table A-3: Capital Inflows Episodes in Emerging Economies (continued)
Ave. Curr. Acct.
Country Start Year Peak Year End Year Episode Length Deficit (%GDP)
Tunisia 2006 2007 2008 3.0 2.7
Bulgaria 2006 2006 2008 3.0 22.6
Russia 1995 1996 1998 4.0 -1.1
Russia 2006 2006 2007 2.0 -7.4
China 1993 1995 1996 4.0 0.1
China 2003 2003 2005 3.0 -4.0
Ukraine 2005 2009 2010 6.0 2.2
Slovak Republic 2005 2006 2007 3.0 5.7
Estonia 2006 2008 2008 3.0 13.5
Latvia 2006 2007 2007 2.0 22.5
Hungary 1993 1994 1995 3.0 8.0
Lithuania 1995 1996 1998 4.0 9.4
Lithuania 2006 2008 2008 3.0 12.9
Slovenia 2001 2001 2002 2.0 -0.6
Slovenia 2007 2007 2008 2.0 4.8
Poland 1992 1994 1995 4.0 2.1
Poland 1998 2000 2000 3.0 5.8
Poland 2007 2008 2010 4.0 5.5
Source: IMF, Authors’ Calculations
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Table A-4: Capital Inflows Episodes in Other Economies
Ave. Curr. Acct.
Country Start Year Peak Year End Year Episode Length Deficit (%GDP)
Costa Rica 1980 1983 1983 4.0 11.7
Costa Rica 2006 2006 2007 2.0 5.4
Dominican Republic 1979 1979 1980 2.0 8.4
Dominican Republic 1991 1991 1993 3.0 4.0
Dominican Republic 2000 2000 2001 2.0 3.6
Dominican Republic 2005 2009 2011 7.0 5.8
Guatemala 1991 1992 1993 3.0 5.0
Guatemala 2000 2000 2001 2.0 6.1
Paraguay 1978 1980 1980 3.0 6.0
Paraguay 1986 1986 1987 2.0 11.8
Jamaica 1981 1983 1985 5.0 11.4
Jamaica 2000 2000 2001 2.0 6.2
Jordan 1991 1992 1992 2.0 12.4
Jordan 2005 2008 2009 5.0 12.2
Sri Lanka 1979 1983 1983 5.0 10.7
Sri Lanka 1991 1992 1995 5.0 5.5
Singapore 1980 1981 1982 3.0 10.4
Singapore 1990 1991 1993 4.0 -9.3
Singapore 2008 2011 2012 5.0 -19.0
Mauritius 1978 1981 1981 4.0 11.6
Mauritius 1988 1988 1990 3.0 3.9
Mauritius 1999 2000 2000 2.0 1.9
Namibia 1999 2000 2001 3.0 -1.5
Namibia 2008 2010 2011 4.0 -0.3
Belarus 2007 2008 2011 5.0 10.1
Albania 1988 1990 1994 7.0 5.3
Albania 2008 2009 2009 2.0 15.5
Croatia 1995 1996 1997 3.0 7.2
Macedonia, FYR 1998 1999 2000 3.0 4.2
Macedonia, FYR 2005 2010 2011 7.0 4.9
Romania 1990 1991 1992 3.0 6.0
Romania 2004 2005 2007 4.0 10.2
Source: IMF, Authors’ Calculations
42
Appendix B: Robustness Checks
Figure B-1: Capital Inflows Episodes and Sectoral Allocation, High and Low VIX
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Table B-1: Alternate Specifications:
Episode Characteristics, Reversals, and Sudden Stops
Specification: Linear Logit
Dependent Variable: Reversal Sudden Stop Reversal Sudden Stop
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Capital Inflows1 0.017 0.014 0.145 0.221
(0.017) (0.02) (0.125) (0.135)
Private Credit2 -0.001 0.011*** -0.01 0.091**
(0.003) (0.004) (0.028) (0.04)
Manuf. Employment3 -0.049 -0.098 -0.357 -0.723
(0.112) (0.093) (0.774) (1.031)
Manuf. Investment3 -0.015 0 -0.091 0.127
(0.042) (0.033) (0.278) (0.33)
Fed Funds Rate4 0.016 0.026 0.137 0.245
(0.026) (0.026) (0.161) (0.198)
Fed Funds Rate4 0.028 -0.047* 0.195 -0.378**
Before Episode (0.023) (0.026) (0.158) (0.192)
Reserve Accumulation5 -0.033 0.01 -0.247 0.075
(0.021) (0.022) (0.154) (0.186)
Initial Reserves5 0.007** -0.008** 0.061* -0.182***
(0.003) (0.004) (0.033) (0.065)
Floating ER6 -0.111 -0.176* -0.727 -1.457*
(0.096) (0.091) (0.636) (0.841)
Financial Openness7 0.001 0.064** -0.015 0.322
(0.027) (0.028) (0.185) (0.257)
Observations 91 91 91 91
R-Squared 0.087 0.33 0.0944 0.392
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
1Percentage points deviation from HP trend. 2Real, per capita terms; log de-
viation from HP trend. 3Share of total, Percentage points deviation from HP
trend. 4Percentage Points. 5Percent of GDP. 6Dummy for floating exchange
rate regime, based on Ilzetzki et al. (2008). 7Chinn-Ito index of financial
openness. Pre- and post-peak values are averages for 3 years before and after
the year capital inflows peak. See Appendix for data sources.
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Table B-2: Alternate Specification:
Episode Characteristics and Economic Performance
Dependent Variable: GDP1 Consumption1 Investment2 Employment2 TFP2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Capital Inflows2 -0.172 -0.479*** -0.647* -0.079 -0.282**
(0.108) (0.122) (0.366) (0.108) (0.119)
Private Credit1 -0.061*** -0.033 -0.255*** -0.035* -0.055***
(0.021) (0.029) (0.079) (0.019) (0.014)
Manuf. Employment3 1.581*** 2.026*** 4.501** 1.469** 0.029
(0.543) (0.719) (1.962) (0.608) (0.441)
Manuf. Investment3 -0.186 -0.151 -0.655 -0.032 -0.003
(0.239) (0.208) (0.793) (0.313) (0.187)
VIX Index -0.041 -0.072 -0.123 -0.039 -0.063
(0.057) (0.066) (0.209) (0.05) (0.046)
VIX Index 0.156** 0.189** 0.339 0.05 0.128*
Before Episode (0.076) (0.086) (0.266) (0.072) (0.067)
Reserve Accumulation4 0.206* 0.315** 1.168*** 0.096 0.380***
(0.107) (0.139) (0.393) (0.117) (0.129)
Initial Reserves4 0.006 -0.021 -0.071 0.004 0.005
(0.022) (0.02) (0.079) (0.022) (0.018)
Floating ER5 0.680* 0.536 3.472** 0.884** 0.176
(0.406) (0.452) (1.579) (0.403) (0.423)
Financial Openness6 0.062 0.208 -0.093 -0.114 0.249
(0.146) (0.172) (0.595) (0.168) (0.191)
Observations 91 90 87 83 83
R-Squared 0.384 0.379 0.454 0.238 0.503
Robust standard errors in parentheses; ** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Dependent variables are
average values for the 3 years after each episode ends. 1Real, per capita terms; log deviation
from HP trend. 2Percentage points deviation from HP trend. 3Share of total, percentage points
deviation from HP trend. 4Percent of GDP. 5Dummy for floating exchange rate regime, based on
Ilzetzki et al. (2008). 6Chinn-Ito index of financial openness. See the Appendix for data sources.
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